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Abstract 
 
The promotion of women’s rights is described as a priority within the external action 
of the European Union (EU). As a result of the Arab Spring uprisings which have been 
ongoing since 2011, democracy and human  rights have been pushed to the 
forefront of European policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean region. The EU could 
capitalise on these transformations to help positively reshape gender relations or it 
could fail to adapt. Thus, the Arab Spring can be seen to serve as a litmus test for the 
EU’s women’s rights policy.  This paper examines how and to what extent the EU 
diffuses women’s rights in this region, by using Ian  Manners’  ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ as the conceptual framework. It argues that while the EU tries to behave as 
a normative force for women’s empowerment by way of ‘informational diffusion’, 
‘transference’ ‘procedural diffusion’ and ‘overt diffusion’; its efforts could, and 
should, be strengthened. There are reservations over the EU’s credibility, choice of 
engagement and its commitment in the face of security and ideological concerns. 
Moreover, it seems that the EU focuses more intently on women’s political rights than 
on their social and economic freedoms.   
 Emily Claire Robinson 
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Introduction: Arab Women and the EU’s Role  
 
The Arab revolutions of 2011 were triggered by the peoples’ wish for freedom and 
justice, the aspiration to influence one’s future and the desire to be full and 
respected citizens of their countries.1 Side by side with the men of the region, Arab 
women were equally engaged in making these demands, which repressive 
authoritarian regimes had denied for so long. In some instances they have even 
been the principal agents of change.2  Despite this, their role in the revolutions and 
more importantly their rights are being neglected, and in some cases even further 
restricted or violated in the transitions. Many Arab women now find themselves in a 
situation that is worse-off than before. As the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network (EMHRN) says, it can be seen that “[w]hile women were, and still are pivotal 
during the uprisings [...] a pattern of marginalizing them is emerging from recent 
legislative and practical developments”.3 
Considering that the revolutions were at least partly concerned with the struggle for 
democracy and human rights, such exclusion of, and discrimination against half the 
population not only denies social justice, but also means that the aims of the 
uprisings are yet to be achieved. In order for the legacy of the Arab Spring to be a 
positive one, many commentators have voiced the opinion that it is vital for 
women’s rights to be recognised in these societies.  
International actors, including the European Union (EU), are being encouraged by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil  society organisations (CSOs) to 
support positive and inclusive reform processes in these societies, in order to help 
make this a reality. While acknowledging that the revolutions have stemmed from 
internal movements, it is widely thought that the reaction  of the international 
community can have a significant, and on occasion even a decisive impact on the 
authority and credibility of a regime and their activities. As Dworkin of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations explains,  
Legitimacy is part of the currency of power in the transitional countries – and 
foreign approval and engagement bolsters the credibility of political leaders. 
                                                 
1 Roth, Kenneth, “Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights”, New York, Human 
Rights Watch, 2011.  
2 Power,  Carla,  “Silent No More: The Women of the Arab Revolutions”, New York, TIME 
magazine - World section, 24 March 2011.  
3 “International Women’s Day 2013”, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 8 March 
2013. BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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The EU should not hesitate to speak out, both privately and publicly, about the 
direction that governments are taking.4 
 
The  European External Action Service (EEAS), led by the High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR), Catherine Ashton, has made the 
promotion of women’s rights in the EU’s relations with third countries a priority field of 
action.5 Despite recent negative trends that have damaged women’s rights in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region, there is still the opportunity and space for gender 
relations to be positively re-shaped as long as many of these countries remain in the 
process of change. Thus the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring revolutions can be said 
to serve as a decisive indicator of whether the EU lives up to the commitments it has 
made on women’s rights. 6 
In light of such considerations, this paper focuses on looking at how and to what 
extent the EU diffuses women’s rights in the Euro-Mediterranean region, with a 
particular emphasis on Egypt and Tunisia. The aim is to identify the different 
instruments and methods employed by the EU in its efforts to foster and promote 
women’s empowerment in the area.   
As its conceptual framework the paper uses Ian Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ 
(NPE), which is a conception of the EU’s behaviour and function in international 
affairs that emphasises the importance of what the EU is.7 Normative power derives 
its power from the ability to exert ideational influence. Manners argues that the EU 
can determine common beliefs, attitudes and understandings of what is accepted 
as routine or commonplace; thus sculpting the perceptions and identities of other 
international actors to correspond with EU norms and values.8 
He identifies five core and four minor norms, which he believes the EU to represent 
and diffuse. 9 This EU normative agenda is said to be diffused via six different 
channels, of which the following four will be looked at for this paper: ‘informational 
                                                 
4 Dworkin, Andrew, “The Struggle for Pluralism after the North African Revolutions”, ECFR Policy 
brief, no. 74, London, European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013, p. 39. 
5 European Commission and the High Representative for European Union Foreign and Security 
Affairs,  Joint Communication: Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External 
Action - Towards a More Effective Approach, COM (2011) 886 final, Brussels, 12 December 
2011, p. 6.  
6 Ibid., p. 5.  
7 Manners, Ian, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, p. 239. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pp. 242-244. Emily Claire Robinson 
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diffusion’, ‘transference’, ‘procedural diffusion’ and ‘overt diffusion’. As ‘contagion’ 
and the EU’s ability to act as a ‘cultural filter’ are not easily identifiable or 
measurable, these diffusion mechanisms will not be looked at. 
Women’s rights, while not specified as one of Manner’s core or minor norms, certainly 
falls under the more general category of ‘human rights’ which Manners identifies. 
Arguably, the promotion of women’s empowerment is also linked to the further core 
norms of ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ and ‘peace’, not to mention the four minor norms of 
‘anti-discrimination’, ‘good governance’, ‘social solidarity’ and ‘sustainable 
development’. This is because the EU very much views women’s rights and 
empowerment as playing a vital role in guaranteeing that these other values can be 
realised. Within the development discourse women are seen as the prime advocates 
of peace. They often maintain the social fabric of societies and when given the 
opportunity to participate, have shown that their involvement in post-conflict 
stabilisation processes contributes to sustainable peace and more prosperous 
societies.10 Moreover, it cannot be said that ‘democracy’ or ‘good governance’ 
exists in a society if there are active elements preventing women’s participation in 
their country’s affairs, either through restrictive laws or due to its patriarchal culture. 
Nor is there ‘social solidarity’, ‘liberty’ or ‘anti-discrimination’ if the rights of women 
are not respected and gender equality is not an aim of society.  
Special reference will be made to Egypt and Tunisia as both countries are at a 
particularly critical moment in their transitions, with women’s rights in these two 
countries especially under threat. It is therefore  arguable that the EU should be 
focusing a great deal of time, energy, effort and money in these countries before 
the transition ‘window of opportunity’ closes. Moreover, Egypt is one of the biggest 
Arab countries which is currently experiencing change and  also one of the most 
significant, due not only to its size but because of the role it plays in the regional 
balance of power, making it essential to observe unfolding events closely. 
Meanwhile Tunisia, although much smaller in size, was the birthplace of the Arab 
uprisings and as such can be said to be viewed by other Arab states and onlookers, 
as a test case, making it ever more important that the direction it takes is positive.  
                                                 
10 Sherriff, Andrew & Barnes, Karen, “Enhancing the EU response to women and armed 
conflict with particular reference to Development Policy”, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management Discussion Paper, no. 84, Maastricht, April 2008, p. 7.  BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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In general it is argued in this paper that EU external action does support the EU’s 
policy objectives of promoting women’s rights in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
However, the EU could do more, especially in the fields of economic and social 
freedoms. The EU is generally strong in its use of rhetoric; meaning that the EU often 
employs ‘informational’ diffusion. This would seem to be the case as not only are 
words easier than actions for the EU, but because declarations and proclamations 
help to contribute to support the categorisation of the EU as a normative power. 
While efforts have been made to procedurally diffuse women’s rights, there are 
questions over the EU’s commitment, which are again raised when analysing the 
mechanism of transference. Despite the EU having utilised a range of instruments in 
its promotion of women’s rights externally, its approach remains very top-down and 
concerned with dealing with the issue on a political level. The EU’s diffusion would 
benefit from being more inclusive of society in general, with a broader and more 
visible engagement with civil society also helping to appease critics of the EU. The EU 
is, however, willing to try out new methods, such as capitalising on the latest 
technological advances, and it recognises the added-value that its Member States 
lend to the cause, often utilising them to great effect.  
This paper examines each of the four diffusion mechanisms in turn, with both the EU’s 
perceived strengths and weaknesses in its use of each being assessed. 
‘Transference’ is looked at first, as there are many EU actions to analyse in this 
category, before the paper moves onto examine what the EU does to ‘overtly’ 
diffuse women’s rights norms in the region. This is followed by an evaluation of the 
EU’s ‘procedural’ dissemination efforts and finally its ‘informational’ diffusion 
mechanisms are addressed, before the paper concludes with an overall assessment 
of the EU’s performance.  
 
Transference 
As a prominent method of EU norm diffusion Manners has identified what he refers to 
as ‘transference’. This is the practice of values being transmitted in the process of 
international trading and in the delivery of aid, skills, knowledge and capacity-
building support.11 Consequently,  the EU’s provision of expertise, its financial aid 
instruments and its use of conditionality in the region will be looked at. 
                                                 
11 Manners, op.cit., p. 245. Emily Claire Robinson 
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‘More for More’  
Conditionality implies that there is a set of criteria to be fulfilled in return for rewards 
such as funds or political support. Therefore, it becomes easy to identify which norms 
the EU is trying to diffuse via the method of transference. In the Southern 
Mediterranean, the major policy in which conditionality can be detected is the 
revised European Neighbourhood Policy, which contains the much discussed ‘More 
for More’ principle. 12  This is generally perceived as an example of positive 
conditionality as incentives, such as increased access to the EU’s Single European 
Market, larger aid packages, greater mobility partnerships and an improved political 
relationship are on offer in return for changes aimed at fostering democratic 
restructuring  and a greater respect for human rights. The EU describes these 
conditions as follows:  
free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and 
a free press and media, the rule of law administered by an independent 
judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law 
enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of 
democratic control over armed and security forces. 13 
These are the criteria to which the EU has dedicated itself for the  evaluation of 
progress within the region and adjusting its degree of assistance to each country 
accordingly. Notably there is no mention of women’s rights. Therefore, on its release, 
this new ENP strategy was heavily criticised by human rights defenders, civil society 
and the European Parliament. The High Representative and the Commissioner for 
European Neighbourhood Policy reacted to this criticism by correcting the omission, 
and sent correspondence to the European Foreign Ministers to indicate that further 
benchmarks, including “non-discrimination on the basis of gender or sexual 
orientation” will now be considered when assessing progress made by the Southern 
Mediterranean countries.14 So the EU is now conditioning its assistance on the basis of 
women’s rights. 
                                                 
12 European Commission and the High Representative for European Union Foreign and 
Security Affairs, Joint Communication: A new Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A 
Review of European Neighbourhood Policy, {SEC (2011) 637-652}, COM (2011)  303 final, 
Brussels, 25 May 2011, pp. 1-24.  
13 Ibid. 
14 “EU policies towards Southern Mediterranean countries: Implementation of the ‘new ENP 
approach’ should match commitments”,  Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 10 
December 2012.  BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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Considering that the EU has consistently acknowledged the unique role that women 
play in the reshaping of a transitioning society and the fact that women’s rights are 
supposed to be a priority in the EU’s external action, it would have been 
unsustainable and indeed damaging to the EU’s credibility and its promotion of 
women’s rights, if EU aid had not been made to be conditional on this basis. This is 
especially true because it quickly became obvious that women were being 
marginalised and excluded in the transitions.  
While the EMHRN has welcomed the broadening of the criteria, it has noted with 
concern that these conditions are yet to be applied consistently when decisions are 
being made as to whether to boost engagement or not.15 It is therefore calling on 
the EU to live up to its promises. This is in line with the European Parliament, which in 
March 2013 adopted a resolution on the situation in Egypt, which “[u]rges the VP/HR 
and the Commission to develop the ‘More for More’ principle, with a particular focus 
on civil society, women's rights and minority rights, in a more coherent and practical 
way”.16 This highlights that the EU’s methods are inconsistent, rather abstract, and 
theoretical in the promotion of the advancement of women via the use of 
‘transference’.  
Questioning of EU Motives 
The EU’s inconsistency in applying conditionality, combined with the fact that the EU 
was not more pro-active,  has led some observers to wonder, as Balfour-Paul of 
Oxfam does, “what is really behind the policy framework, the extent of 
conditionality, and the process for adoption of decisions [which] has called into 
question the EU’s good intentions”.17 In line with realist thought, there has been the 
suggestion from some quarters that while the EU presents itself as a normative power 
and great promoter of women’s rights, this is in fact simply a means to legitimise its 
actions while instead continuing to practice realpolitik; the protection of its interests. 
This is something which many would agree has been previously witnessed in the EU’s 
support of authoritarian regimes in the region. Boubakri has commented that until 
now relations between the EU and the Arab world have been monopolised by two 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 European Parliament, “Resolution of 14 March 2013 on the Situation of Women in Egypt”, 
P7_TA-PROV(2013)0095, Strasbourg. 
17 Balfour-Paul, Jaime,  “Power to the People? Reactions to the EU’s response to the Arab 
Spring”, Oxfam Briefing Note, Oxford, Oxfam International, 15 November 2011, p. 3.  Emily Claire Robinson 
10 
principal aims; the enhancement of economic ties and the underpinning of security 
assistance.18 He argues that while they are both justifiable, they have been followed 
to the detriment of human rights and democracy.  
There is considerable discussion surrounding the ‘values versus interests’ debate, with 
some commentators suggesting that that the EU will never fully apply such strict 
conditionality where there is the possibility that EU commercial, energy or security 
interests could be harmed as a result. Balfour-Paul is suspicious of the revised ENP, 
warning that “[t]he inconsistent interpretation of More for More, taken together with 
the track record of the EU on turning a blind eye to dictatorship, creates a fear that 
agendas additional to democracy and human rights are at play”.19 
It is certainly true that in the Euro-Mediterranean  region, the EU has an array of 
significant interests. A considerable proportion of the EU’s energy supplies come from 
Algeria, for instance, and, more generally, it is desirable that there is stability in the 
region not only for fears of migration but because of trade links. This demonstrates 
that there are indeed severe limitations to the EU’s potential normative influence due 
to concern for its geopolitical interests.  
In practice, the ‘More for More’ policy should provide for a meritocratic allocation of 
funds, which allows neighbours to be set apart from each other on the basis of their 
behaviour. However, some commentators such as Popescu of the European Council 
on Foreign Relations believe that “‘More for more’ runs up against geography and 
geopolitics as other key criteria for capturing EU attention. Geography is unbeatable 
in many ways”. 20  This likely explains the difference in the EU’s application of 
conditionality, from one country to the next within the ENP and demonstrates that 
the EU’s willingness  and ability to act as a normative power can waver and be 
uneven.  
‘Less for Less’ 
A persistent question which is raised with regard to the ‘More for More’ concept is 
whether this conversely implies ‘less for less’. EU officials from both the EEAS and the 
                                                 
18 Boubakri, Amor, The Impact of the European Union’s Policies on the Role of the State in 
Democracy Building in the Arab World, Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2010.  
19 Balfour-Paul, op.cit., p. 6.  
20 Popescu, Nicu, “More for More in the Neighbourhood”, euobserver.com, Brussels, 22 March 
2011. BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DevCo) were very cautious 
in their responses. While they agreed that in theory ‘less for less’ could be applied in 
respect of women’s rights violations, Mr Cortezon-Gomez of DG DevCo, for instance, 
indicated that this would be unlikely in practice as a certain level of funds need to 
be secured to provide foreign governments with a degree of assurance so that they 
can plan projects which contribute to reform processes. “The idea is to secure a 
certain percentage of funds and from there, apply the ‘More for More’.” 21 
Opinion is divided over whether ‘less for less’, which would be a form of negative 
conditionality, should be an available policy option to the EU or not. The Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network has heartily encouraged the EU to make it 
one, seeing this as a way for the EU to uphold its commitments to women’s rights.22 
However, there are robust arguments which advise against the EU withdrawing aid or 
trade links with countries that are in the process of democratisation. As Dworkin 
highlights, “Egypt and Tunisia already face serious economic and social problems, 
and further hardship is likely to fuel public unrest and the flight to political 
extremism”. 23 EU officials who were interviewed by the author were of a similar 
opinion. It was argued that by applying ‘less for less’ it is only likely that the local 
population will be hurt while not achieving the stated objectives either.24  
Any Remaining EU Credibility and Leverage? 
The EU’s policy towards the Southern Mediterranean before the Arab Spring 
revolutions can be described as one of containment. Concerned by the prospect of 
terrorism, illegal migration, political Islam and transnational criminal networks 
involved in smuggling, the EU chose to cooperate with the authoritarian regimes in 
the region. In return for maintaining stability, these governments were, as Roth puts it, 
compensated by the EU with a whole host of aid and trade packages.25 Now that 
these dictators have fallen and the EU has adapted  its strategy to the changed 
context, with a heavy emphasis on conditionality linked to democracy promotion 
and human rights, questions have been asked regarding the EU’s credibility, and in 
turn, leverage in the region.  
                                                 
21  Interview with Alberto Cortezon-Gomez,  DG Development Cooperation, European 
Commission, Brussels, 18 March 2013. 
22 EMHRN, “EU should match ‘ENP’ commitments”, op.cit. 
23 Dworkin, op.cit., p. 37. 
24 Cortezon-Gomez, op.cit.  
25 Roth, op.cit. Emily Claire Robinson 
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The problem of EU credibility matters enormously for the diffusion of women’s rights. If 
local populations do not see the EU as a legitimate actor but instead as fickle and 
even contradictory, the values and messages which the EU is attempting to transmit 
will not be internalised and the EU will have a problem with winning the hearts and 
minds of the population. Therefore, it would seem wise that the EU tackles this issue of 
credibility. Delivering on its promises in relation to women’s rights conditionality would 
certainly be a good place to start.  
Questions related to EU leverage are also being asked because of global power 
shifts to the East, which are challenging the supremacy of the EU and of the West in 
general. The Gulf states in particular seem to be exerting more influence in the Euro-
Mediterranean region.  26 Their ability to provide funding without ‘strings’ related to 
human rights and democracy could be argued to be weakening the relevance of 
the EU and its ability to diffuse women’s rights norms, especially when their value 
systems may indeed downplay the status of women.  
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  
Moving away from the EU’s use of conditionality, it can be seen that there are many 
funding tools which the EU employs within the Euro-Mediterranean region. While the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) provides the main 
framework for the delivery of EU aid to the region, the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is unique in its characteristics and thus has 
been selected  for analysis because it is interesting to look at the added value it 
brings to the EU’s diffusion of women’s rights externally. The additional worth of this 
financial instrument stems from the freedom it has from governments.  27 In other 
words, the host country in which it operates does not need to grant permission for it 
to intervene, thus coordinating directly with CSOs. The EU explains that “[t]hanks to its 
independence from governments, the EIDHR is able to focus on sensitive political 
issues and innovative approaches”. 28  
                                                 
26 Haykel, Bernard, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution”, Gulf Analysis Paper, 
Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies: Middle East Program, 
February 2013, p. 1. 
27 European Commission: DG for Development and Cooperation, Delivering on the Arab 
Spring: Highlights of the Semester July-December 2011, Brussels, 2012, p. 9. 
28 Ibid.   BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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Women’s rights and empowerment form part of the EIDHR’s focus areas.29 It has 
become clear that the EU is willing to use this instrument for such purposes in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region. The Commission has provided the example of the EU’s 
support to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia. In 2010, before the transition, the EIDHR 
was involved in assisting the Tunisian  Association of Democrat Women  (ATFD), 
among others, for actions that were not permitted in the country under the previous 
government. The Commission states that the“[l]ack of publicity for EIDHR involvement 
at the time could have been interpreted as abandonment or lack of responsiveness; 
EIDHR was in fact very active and ultimately successful”. 30  
This highlights that the EU is in some instances prepared to work not only in 
partnership to diffuse women’s rights in the Euro-Mediterranean area, but covertly 
should difficult situations demand it. While this does mean that the EU suffers from a 
lack of visibility in some cases, it shows that the EU is also acting responsibly in its 
diffusion of women’s rights as it seeks to protect its local partners in sensitive 
situations, where such values are not welcomed.  
Transference as Expertise  
A very obvious example of the EU engaging in the use of ‘transference’ to support 
women’s rights is the ongoing expertise it is providing in the drafting of the Tunisian 
Constitution. The High Representative confirmed that “[n]umerous contacts and 
discrete  demarches  have taken place to express to the authorities and to the 
different political forces the EU's point of view on some aspects of the draft text 
which have raised concern”. 31 
This is an example of the EU working quietly but effectively behind the scenes to 
diffuse women’s rights. Moreover, it is arguable that this is an example of the EU 
exercising its normative power in a way which may have helped to maintain the 
status quo in Tunisia. It is possible that without such efforts, legislative attempts to 
change the Constitution, which would have  been to the detriment of women’s 
rights, may have succeeded and the situation for women could have deteriorated.  
 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 6. 
30 Ibid., p. 9. 
31 European Parliament, Ashton, Catherine, “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-
President Ashton on behalf of the Commission”, E000682-13, Strasbourg, 12 March 2013. Emily Claire Robinson 
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Overt Diffusion  
Manners employs the use of ‘overt diffusion’ to explain the role played by EU 
Delegations in a third country, and any visits made by EU officials.32 Hence, the 
presence and contributions of a number of high-profile and visible EU actors who 
have travelled to the region recently will be looked at, as will the role of the 
Delegations who liaise with local civil society organisations and engage in a series of 
human rights dialogues with the authorities of the Euro-Mediterranean countries. 
EU Delegations and Human Rights Guidelines  
A series of eight human rights guidelines have been developed for EU actors, to 
follow and implement in their activities, including statements and demarches. 
Number seven is dedicated to ‘Violence against women and girls and combating all 
forms of discrimination against them’.33 The existence of these guidelines symbolises 
the political will and commitment  behind them. They provide Delegations with a 
standardised reference point, which should contribute to greater consistency in EU 
dissemination of women’s rights norms. Within the guidelines on women, it states that 
the EU “must in particular focus on legislation and public policies which discriminate 
against women and girls, and the lack of diligence in combating discrimination 
practised in the private sphere and gender-stereotyping”.34 
Having spoken with an EU Delegation official in Egypt, it is clear that these 
instructions, especially in relation to an emphasis on tackling insufficient legislation, 
are indeed implemented on the ground, and in respect to third country 
representatives within multilateral forums such as the United Nations. 35 
Communication is strong between various EU actors, as well as with EU Member 
States representatives. Concerted efforts are made to ensure that messages used in 
lobbying and demarches in different settings remain uniform and constant. 36 In 
spring 2013, for example, possible linkages between the situation of women in Egypt 
                                                 
32 Manners, op.cit., p. 245. 
33  “EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of 
discrimination against them”, European Commission: DG RELEX, Brussels, 8 December 2008, 
pp. 1-19.  
34 Ibid., p. 2. 
35 Interview with EU Delegation Official, EEAS, via telephone, 23 April 2013.  
36 Ibid.  BRIGG Paper 1/2013 
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and lobbying towards an agreed resolution on ‘Violence against Women’ in the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women were identified and exploited.37 
Additionally, the EU often takes advantage of its Member States by using them as 
another diffusion channel to help communicate and complement certain women’s 
rights messages. This serves to increase pressure on countries which are performing 
poorly in the realm of women’s rights.38 It certainly seems that the EU has a highly 
coordinated approach to its diffusion. Its frequent communication and burden-
sharing of tasks with Member States shows that the EU often harnesses the collective 
weight of its Member States to transmit its values to greater effect. 
Human Rights Dialogues  
Within the Euro-Mediterranean region, the EU engages in a series of Human Rights 
dialogues, with women’s rights featuring heavily. Many commentators are, however, 
sceptical of their value. Phillips, of the EU Observer, has branded such meetings as 
‘soft talk’. 39 They are also seen by many as being an example of the EU trying to 
push a ‘Europeanised’ conception of human rights in a very top-down, even 
paternalistic approach.  
An EU Delegation official disputed such an accusation by maintaining that the EU is 
putting pressure on these governments to act.40 She said that the EU was currently 
working hard to raise a series of pertinent concerns with the appropriate Egyptian 
authorities over the lack of protection that the Penal Code provides for women, 
especially in terms of personal status laws and domestic violence. It is clear from this 
that EU Delegation officials are certainly working hard to diffuse women’s rights but 
that this is rather more on an official and legislative level as opposed to on a more 
essentially societal basis. 
Diffusion by Proxy  
The Delegation has also been working to combat female genital mutilation practices 
in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 41 
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Furthermore, she talked of the contract which was signed in March 2013, giving funds 
for UN Women to implement a project aimed at empowering women from all social 
circumstances. This indicates that the EU often promotes women’s rights by proxy, 
which is what EU officials believe can to some extent explain the EU’s lack of visibility 
amongst local populations, as well as a lack of external recognition of EU efforts. 
Such cooperation and use of another actor has also been highlighted in a further 
partnership with the UN; a project entitled ‘Spring Forward for Women’. This 
programme has the objective of assisting local, regional and national initiatives “to 
ensure women’s active engagement in decision-making, empower women 
economically and enhance regional knowledge and experience-sharing on 
women’s political and economic rights”.42  
‘Spring Forward for Women’ recognises that the sustainability of change is 
dependent on local ownership and leadership. This is an important example of the 
EU adopting a more grassroots approach towards women’s empowerment in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region, as engaging with CSOs is more likely to be perceived by 
local populations as a partnership instead of a case of imposition. This project is a 
positive example of what all EU officials have tried to press upon in interviews. They 
maintain that the EU is in the process of transitioning towards the pursuit of a 
differentiated, tailored strategy, which is welcoming of civil society organisations’ 
input, as opposed to a diffusion of norms which is top-down and open to 
accusations of paternalism. 
Partnering with Civil Society  
The notion of the EU reaching out to civil society organisations is rather disputed by 
NGOs and grassroots organisations in both Europe and the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. While the EU is ready with available funds, involvement in programming 
activities has not materialised. Balfour-Paul has stated that the ENP review and 
revision was predominantly conducted in Brussels, while “[c]ivil society in the region 
has found it hard to engage in the articulation and development of the new policy 
[‘More for More’]”.43 Moreover, the EMHRN expressed its strong disappointment that 
within the framework of the EU’s new diplomatic instrument, the Taskforce, which 
was applied within Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia, “the EU’s invitation to Egyptian human 
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rights NGOs for a civil society consultation meeting [...] was withdrawn due to 
pressure from the Egyptian authorities”. 44 This again highlights that the EU’s rhetoric 
on partnering with civil society in the region is not matched in reality and that the EU 
is letting itself be bullied. This is highly damaging to the credibility of the EU and its 
commitment to the dissemination of its values.  On a positive note, the EU has 
provided the funds to support its rhetoric of engaging with civil society. In 2011 a Civil 
Society Facility for North Africa and the Middle East was launched. 45 
Absent Stakeholders  
Another notable omission from the EU’s engagement in the region is contact and 
liaison with Islamic organisations. The EU seems reluctant to deal with political Islam 
unless forced to do so in instances such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
However, as the influence of Islam is clearly very prominent within Arab societies this 
would appear to be quite a serious oversight. Many commentators believe that it is 
vital that the EU enters into dialogue with all stakeholders, without selectively 
choosing only those which are in accordance with the EU view. As Isabelle Ioannides 
from the Bureau of European Policy Advisers has stated, the EU 
should avoid isolating interlocutors who do not agree with 'our line' by refusing 
to talk to them, as was done with the PLO for decades and with Hamas and 
the Taliban in recent years. There are lessons to be learned from these 
experiences.46  
Roth agrees with such an assessment and believes that the EU must recognise that 
political Islam represents a ‘majority preference’, and as such the EU cannot 
disregard this popularity as it would mean contravening democratic principles.47 He 
emphasises that accepting political Islam, does not equate to disregarding human 
rights. Roth states that “[i]t is important to nurture the rights-respecting elements of 
political Islam while standing firm against repression in its name”.48 It would seem to 
only make sense that, especially on the issue of women’s rights promotion, the EU 
should try to engage with Islam, as this would appear to be where many 
divergences arise. While human rights and women’s rights should be seen as 
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universal, the EU should start by looking for the compatibilities between Islam and 
women’s rights. By not engaging with all stakeholders in the region, and especially 
one as influential as political Islam, it would seem that the EU is rendering its own 
diffusion less effective. Not only this, but it contradicts its own belief in the value of 
working with local and regional groups.  
EU Representatives  
The EU’s physical presence in the region is made-up of EU Delegation officials and 
the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean (EUSR), whose 
mandate includes fighting violence and discrimination against women. 49 There are 
a number of other EU representatives who have visited the region recently, including 
the High Representative, who has been strong in her commitment to the diffusion of 
women’s rights. In February 2012, for example, she travelled to Egypt and delivered 
her keynote speech at an EU conference entitled ‘Egyptian Women: The Way 
Forward’.  
The EU Special Representative for Human Rights; Stavros Lambrinidis, has also been to 
the region on a number of occasions since the uprisings. He has called on the 
Egyptian authorities to do more to protect women’s rights and stated that the EU will 
increase its efforts to share 
[b]est practice on how to achieve equal pay for equal work, equal 
opportunities for participation in the political process and decision making, 
protecting and preserving women’s dignity and integrity and working for an 
end to gender-based violence. 50 
 
Interestingly he also appealed to the media to assist the EU in creating awareness of 
the need for equality and asked them to do so through balanced reporting.51 This is 
an example of the EU’s willingness to again use a proxy to help transmit its messages 
concerning women’s rights. Catherine Ashton also indicated that Helga Schmidt, the 
EEAS Political Director, had been to Egypt to help in “drafting a national strategy for 
combating violence against women as a basis for a comprehensive law”. 52 This 
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certainly shows that EU actors who visit the region on an ad hoc  basis have 
undoubtedly made the diffusion of women’s rights, and especially their protection 
from violence, a priority.  
Procedural Diffusion  
Manners has identified and categorised ‘procedural’ diffusion to refer to the 
institutionalisation of relations between a third party and the EU.53 This translates to 
mean a number of different things in practice, including looking at the behaviour 
and actions of the EU within international organisations and analysing the formalised 
framework of agreements between the EU and a third party.  
Association Agreements, Action Plans and Progress Reports   
Association Agreements are international accords which the EU has established with 
third countries, in an attempt to create an all-encompassing structure which 
provides the basis for governing bilateral relations. The aim of these agreements is to 
initiate and foster close cooperation of both an economic and political nature, 
which consequently leads to an advantageous relationship between the EU and its 
partner country.54  
It is significant to note that these agreements are legally binding in nature and yet 
having analysed the Association Agreements for both Egypt and Tunisia, it has been 
found that there is little mention of women’s rights or empowerment in either 
document. There are merely two references in the Egyptian accord; art. 42 which 
relates to women in higher education and art. 65 which refers to the role of women 
in economic and social development. 55 The latter appears as art. 71 in the Tunisian 
agreement, and is in fact the only mention with regards to women.56 While these 
agreements were signed previous to the EEAS’s focus on women’s empowerment, it 
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indicates that the EU struggles to procedurally diffuse women’s rights norms within this 
framework.  
It should be noted, however, that all Association Agreements are required to contain 
an ‘essential elements’ clause.57 This means that should a partner country or indeed 
the EU, violate human rights, the agreement can be suspended. In theory this 
appears to be a robust mechanism to serve for the protection of women’s rights. 
However, as the EU does not use this tool at its disposal, having only withdrawn 
unilateral trade preferences in less than a handful of extreme cases, and never within 
reciprocal trade agreements, it cannot be said in practice to do anything for 
women’s rights diffusion.  
In stark contrast to the Association Agreements, the Action Plans contain a multitude 
of references to women’s rights.58 These documents are a central component of the 
primarily bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy and, as opposed to the 
Association Agreements, are only politically binding. The EU explains the Action Plans 
as developing a programme based on short-term priorities.59 While it is encouraging 
to see that there is EU political will to raise the issue of gender equality with partner 
countries, the value of the commitments in the Association Agreements and the 
Action  Plans  are not equal, which matters for the question of accountability. As 
Action Plans are merely political and not legally binding, the EU lacks any real means 
of recourse or any kind of enforcement mechanism to ensure that partner countries 
uphold their commitments, especially as ‘less for less’ has been confirmed as not 
being an option.  
To partly mitigate the problem of accountability, the EU also uses ‘Progress Reports’. 
These documents jointly produced by the European Commission and the EEAS 
monitor and evaluate developments in a partner country. This helps to inform EU 
policy-making towards the country in question. However, there have been 
suggestions that the content of Progress Reports is open to influence from 
governments or other actors and therefore often does not accurately reflect the 
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situation in a country. This in turn casts doubt over the value and credibility of 
Progress Reports and it can  be said that the EU, by not using this mechanism 
correctly, is missing out on an opportunity to put human rights protection at the top 
of the agenda in its relations with partner countries. Recently the EMHRN has 
indicated that, “[s]ome reports still have  gaps concerning assessment of progress 
towards human rights and gender equality”.60 It would therefore seem that the EU is 
not particularly strong in its ‘procedural’ diffusion of women’s rights when it comes to 
Association Agreements, Action Plans or Progress Reports.   
Union for the Mediterranean  
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a multilateral partnership between the EU 
and the Southern Mediterranean area, with the aim being to boost cooperation on 
a regional basis through more pragmatic means. In terms of the UfM’s relevance to 
the EU’s diffusion of women’s rights, it would seem to be a platform which is being 
utilised ever more to place emphasis on the issue. While women’s empowerment 
does not explicitly form part of the six priority areas, there are a number of initiatives 
concerned with women’s rights. Significantly, these projects focus on women’s 
economic and social freedoms, as opposed to their political rights which the EU 
seems to strongly promote via the other diffusion channels. A project entitled ‘Young 
Women as Job Creators’, which assists in developing young female entrepreneurs 
and promotes self-employment, is just one example.61  
While activities are on a small scale, this would seem to be the first substantial 
indication that the EU’s approach to diffusing women’s rights is not completely top-
down, but that there is an element of trying to use some bottom-up methods. This is 
an approach which is likely to be more successful in the long term at helping to 
internalise ideas of women’s empowerment and equality as it is on a more local 
level. Moreover, it can be argued to have a positive-multiplier effect; meaning that 
the skills developed through these projects can be further shared. While these 
projects are relatively limited, their impact, if more frequently employed, could 
potentially be relatively big. In general, it is a positive example of the EU’s diffusion of 
women’s rights and empowerment, especially in terms of economic and social 
freedoms.  
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Informational Diffusion  
The last diffusion mechanism which will be looked at is categorised as ‘informational’. 
Manners has identified this as being exemplified by strategic communications, 
targeted policy initiatives and declaratory pronouncements. 62 Thus a range of 
pertinent documents, including press releases and social media exchanges, will be 
analysed.  
Euro-Mediterranean Communications  
Until July 2013 there have been five strategic communications specific to the Euro-
Mediterranean region which the EU has released since the Arab Spring uprisings.63 
Having analysed these documents, it would seem that they are rather lacking in 
reference to women’s rights in comparison with the overarching guidelines and 
policy documents which steer general EU external action and make women’s rights 
a priority of EU foreign policy.64 Only a handful of references are made to women’s 
rights and empowerment. In particular, the 2012 ENP Roadmap was criticised by the 
EMHRN which was concerned that it “does not include women’s rights and gender 
equality, neither in the objectives for building sustainable democracies nor in the 
objectives for inclusive development and growth.” 65 This suggests that there is a lack 
of ambition from the EU and is just one example of how weak the EU’s diffusion of 
women’s rights is within strategic policy documents specific to the region. Moreover, 
these communications are again an example of a very top-down diffusion of 
women’s rights.  
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Through its communications the EU places great emphasis upon women’s 
participation in political life. When it was suggested to EU officials that this was to the 
detriment of the EU’s dissemination of women’s social and economic freedoms, this 
was disputed. 66 It was argued that while the EU perhaps does not rhetorically 
emphasise women’s social rights, the EU does work consistently on the issue; it is 
simply more discrete, and purposefully so, in order to avoid controversy. “Social 
quarrels between the EU and host countries can generate bad publicity, which is 
undesirable.”  67 So the EU often works in partnership with the likes of the UN and 
keeps a low-key, behind-the-scenes approach, which would seem to indicate a 
good understanding of the cultural context in which the EU is working and the need 
to maintain a constructive image in the region to be successful in its aims.  
Interactive and Responsive Diffusion  
Moving away from policy documents and initiatives, it can be seen that the EU is 
extremely active in its use of other declaratory instruments such as statements, press 
releases and social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. In particular, the 
EU often uses these tools in a reactionary manner. In the first six months of 2013 the 
High Representative released a number of statements relating to female 
empowerment, including for example the situation of women’s rights in Egypt and a 
statement to celebrate international women’s day.68 While EU officials recognise that 
“very few people read these statements which indeed could have much stronger 
language”, 69 it is thought that they remain important for their symbolic value, as they 
signal the EU’s intent to keep publicly pressurising governments which violate 
women’s rights.  
Most EU Delegations and representatives such as the EUSR for Human Rights and the 
High Representative also have Facebook pages and Twitter accounts. This can be 
said to be an attempt by the EU to be less top-down in its diffusion as these platforms 
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are interactive and allow for engagement with local populations. 70 However, it 
seems unlikely that many people within the Euro-Mediterranean region follow the EU 
on these platforms, either due to an inability, lack of interest or awareness and in 
some instances they may even be unable due to government restrictions.  
Conclusion: Outcome of the Litmus Test  
This paper has looked at how and to what extent the EU diffuses women’s rights in 
the Euro-Mediterranean area. Through the application of Ian Manners’ approach of 
Normative Power Europe, and the use of four of his six diffusion mechanisms 
(‘informational’, ‘procedural’, ‘overt’ and ‘transference’), it has been found that the 
EU uses these channels to different effect, to support its foreign policy objective of 
promoting women’s rights. In response to the Arab Spring, the EU has adapted its 
policy and certainly cannot be said to be ignoring the ‘window of opportunity’ 
which exists to positively reshape gender relations within the Euro-Mediterranean 
societies. The EU is living up to its promise to make the advancement of women a 
foreign policy objective.  
Overall, the EU’s approach has been found to be very top-down in nature, despite 
objections from EU officials that this is not the case. While it has been said that the EU 
itself is in the process of transitioning towards adopting a new strategy towards the 
region, it is yet to come to fruition, with little evidence of an extensive grassroots 
approach in existence. It has also been noted that the EU is particularly keen in its 
diffusion of women’s political rights,  more so than in their social and economic 
freedoms.  
‘Informational’ diffusion is where the EU can be said to be particularly strong. While 
strategic documents specific to the region are not especially heavy in their 
reference to women, more general external relations guidelines do make it clear 
that women’s rights are a priority of foreign policy. Furthermore, the EU does readily 
and persistently employ reactive press releases and statements in response to 
women’s rights concerns or violations, even if the language utilised could often be 
stronger. It would seem appropriate and in line with the EU’s normative basis that it is 
so rhetorically present, as words seem to come easier than actions for the EU. The EU 
has also adopted the use of new technology, harnessing the power of social media 
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platforms such as Twitter and Facebook which demonstrates the EU’s desire to be 
more interactive in its engagement.  
In terms of ‘procedural’ diffusion, the EU performs fairly poorly. EU Association 
Agreements and Progress Reports are lacklustre in their promotion of women’s rights. 
Action Plans often include women’s empowerment as an objective to be achieved; 
however, the lack of an enforcement mechanism means that without the political 
will of a partner country, the priorities contained within Action Plans are relatively 
useless.  
The EU does perform better within the regional Union for the Mediterranean, which 
provides examples of more localised, tangible initiatives that the EU is using to 
promote women’s empowerment. The actions within these settings demonstrate the 
EU to be focused on more than simply increasing women’s political participation. 
Unfortunately, the scale of these projects is rather small to have a significant impact.  
In relation to the ‘overt’ diffusion of women’s rights, it seems fair to say that EU actors 
have demonstrated their worth in this field. EU Delegations seem especially active, 
consistent and dogmatic in communicating EU messages on women’s rights. EU 
officials also recognise the added value that its Member States can lend to the 
cause and often utilises them to complement EU efforts to great effect.  
It has also been demonstrated that the EU is content to use a proxy such as UNDP to 
implement more visible projects, especially in instances related to more socially 
controversial issues such as female genital mutilation. On the other hand, the EU 
seems less willing to embrace stakeholders more generally, especially if they do not 
follow the ‘European’ line. The EU’s lack of engagement with political Islam in the 
region is an example of this, and while the EU is financially very supportive of civil 
society, participation of CSOs in programming is yet to be realised. It is considered 
that the EU’s engagement in the region could benefit from a more inclusive 
approach towards society in general. 
The EU’s use of ‘transference’ also provides for a mixed report. The EU’s employment 
of the EIDHR shows that it is willing to diffuse women’s rights in a responsible yet 
covert manner should the situation demand it. The EU is also seen to be very strong in 
its provision of expertise, while conversely its use of conditionality, as articulated by 
the ‘More for More’ policy, is questionable. The late addition of women’s rights as 
part of the policy conditions and the inconsistent implementation of the ‘More for 
More’ approach raise questions over the EU’s commitment to women’s rights within Emily Claire Robinson 
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the Euro-Mediterranean region. It would certainly seem that geostrategic interests 
are a limitation in the diffusion of women’s rights.  
Questions regarding the EU’s credibility and leverage in the region do pose a 
considerable challenge to the EU’s diffusion of women’s rights in the region. 
However, if as EU officials insist, the EU is moving towards adopting a more grassroots 
approach, then this will certainly help to make future actions more readily 
accepted.71  
In conclusion, the Arab Spring has proved to be a ‘litmus test’ for the EU’s women’s 
rights policy in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The findings indicate the EU’s policy to 
have reasonably withstood the scrutiny. While the EU could improve its diffusion of 
women’s rights in the Euro-Mediterranean region, it is certainly making an effort to 
ensure that social justice becomes a reality, so that the legacy of the Arab Spring is a 
positive one for women. However, not only does societal change take time, but it 
would seem that ultimately external efforts must be equally supported by internal 
impulses for change to be sustainable. From Saudi Arabia to Libya, Arab women 
have thus far made their voices heard, with the help of the international community; 
hopefully women’s rights will become a reality in the Euro-Mediterranean region in 
the not too distant future.  
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